Final causes

 

 

Si enim non sunt causæ finales, non rationi est finis consequendi veritatem ac consciendi bonum. Relictum nobis nihil nisi quæquæ libidines quas fortasse habeamus, quamquam propter originem—hereditatem, circumstantias, casum—sed illæ erint prælata subjectiva, non repercussūs bonitatis ac malitiæ objectivæ. Nec potest ullum facere ratio præterquam nobis dicere quo modo possimus illas libidines consequi; quia non sunt essentiæ ac naturæ rerum, nec ullæ causæ finales ac destinata naturala, nos non possit certiores facere quæ libidines a nobis optandæ sint.

 

If there are no final causes, then reason does not have as its purpose the attainment of truth or the knowledge of the good. What we are left with are at best whatever desires we actually happen to have, for whatever reason—heredity, environment, luck—but these will be subjective preferences rather than reflective of objective goodness or badness. And the most reason can do is tell us how we can fulfill those desires; since there are no natures or causes or essences of things, not any final causes or natural purposes either, it cannot tell us what desires we ought to have.

 

—Edvardius Feserus (Edward Feser), The Last Superstition